URBANO M. MORENO, G.R. No. 168550
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
-
versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS TINGA,
and
NORMA L. MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Respondents. GARCIA,
and
VELASCO, J., JJ.
Promulgated:
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D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
In this Petition[1]
dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails
the Resolution[2] of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc dated
June 1, 2005, affirming the Resolution[3] of
the Comelec First Division dated November 15, 2002
which, in turn, disqualified him from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections.
The following are the undisputed
facts:
Norma L. Mejes
(Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from
running for Punong Barangay
on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months
and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar
on August 27, 1998.
The case was forwarded to the Office
of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for
preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer
recommended that
The Comelec
First Division adopted this recommendation.
On motion for
reconsideration filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First
Division was affirmed. According to the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified
from running for any elective local position.[5] Since
Further, the Comelec
en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take
precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by
In this petition,
In its Comment[6]
dated
In contrast,
The resolution of the present
controversy depends on the application of the phrase “within two (2) years
after serving sentence” found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which
reads:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a)
Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
[Emphasis supplied.]
. .
. .
We should mention at this juncture
that there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary Detention, the crime of
which
In this sense, Dela
Torre v. Comelec is not
squarely applicable. Our pronouncement
therein that the grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code was based primarily on the finding that
the crime of fencing of which petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude,
a circumstance which does not obtain in this case. At any rate, the phrase “within two (2) years
after serving sentence” should have been interpreted and understood to apply
both to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final
judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The
placing of the comma (,) in the provision means that the phrase modifies both
parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
The Court’s declaration on the effect
of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, we should add, ought
to be considered an obiter in view of the fact that Dela
Torre was not even entitled to probation because he
appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court which, however, affirmed
his conviction. It has been held that
the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative remedy of
availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is to prevent speculation
or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, did
not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal.[9]
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code appears innocuous enough at first glance.
The phrase “service of sentence,” understood in its general and common
sense, means the
confinement of a convicted
person in a penal facility for the
period adjudged by the court.[10] This seemingly clear and unambiguous
provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Court’s attention
because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is
alleged to have broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who did
not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted probation.
In Baclayon
v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order
placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a
suspension of the imposition of sentence.
We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition
of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage. We thus deleted from the order
granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from
continuing with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant
case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right
to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period[11]
imposed upon
It appears then that during the
period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for
a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office
is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a
person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence
adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law
specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the
sentence. During the period of
probation,[12] the probationer does not serve the penalty
imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.[13]
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in
this case. They focused on the fact that
The Comelec
could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the
letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been sentenced
by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or
more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
This is as good a time as any to
clarify that those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of
probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence,
should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because
the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code does not even begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already
issued an order finally discharging
Even assuming that there is an
ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which gives room for
judicial interpretation,[14] our
conclusion will remain the same.
It is unfortunate that the
deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no clue as to the intended
meaning of the phrase “service of sentence,” i.e., whether the
legislature also meant to disqualify those who have been granted
probation. The Court’s function, in the
face of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the Probation
Law and the Local Government Code. Interpretare et concordare
legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.
Probation is not a right of an
accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity
conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby
escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of
which he was convicted.[15] Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent
standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits
of probation shall not be extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum term
of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted of any offense against
the security of the State; those who have previously been convicted by final
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month
and one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those who have
been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence at the time
the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became applicable.[16]
It is important to note that the
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code covers offenses
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers
probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically
disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers
a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class
of offenders not covered by the disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that
the present Local Government Code was enacted in 1991, some seven (7) years
after Baclayon v. Mutia
was decided. When the legislature approved the enumerated disqualifications
under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge
of our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of probation on the
disqualification from holding public office.
That it chose not to include probationers within the purview of the
provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to disqualify
probationers.
On this score, we agree with
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code in a way that broadens the scope of the disqualification to
include
Finally, we note that
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Resolution of the Commission on Elections en banc dated June 1, 2005
and the Resolution of its First Division dated November 15, 2002, as well as
all other actions and orders issued pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is
directed to proceed in accordance with this Decision. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO
Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
|
|
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
C E R T I F I C
A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[5]Comelec Resolution No. 4801, otherwise known as the “Guidelines
on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy in Connection with the Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections,” has a similar provision in Sec. 3(a)
thereof.
[10]Art.
86 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalties of reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, prision
mayor, prison correccional and arresto mayor, shall be executed and served
in the places and penal establishments provided by the Administrative Code in
force or which may be provided by law in the future.
[12]Presidential Decree No. 968 (1976), as amended, Probation Law of 1976. Sec. 14. The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than one (1) year shall not exceed two (2) years, and in all other cases, said period shall not exceed six (6) years.
[17]Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, G.R. No. 159647,